Development of policy & institutional option

“Best bet” Land-use Systems

Country reports

Alternatives To Slash-And-Burn In Indonesia

Unique id: IDAZQYWB

Source file: D:\Projects\ASB\ASB Country and Thematic reports\Indonesia PhaseII report\Part VI VII plus annexes.xml

Authors: Thomas P. Tomich, Meine van Noordwijk, Suseno Budidarsono, Andy Gillison, Trikurnianti Kusumanto, Daniel Murdiyarso, Fred Stolle, Ahmad M. Fagi, Iswandi Anas, A.F.S. Budiman, Kenneth Chomitz, Rebecca Elmhirst, Chip Fay, Hubert de Foresta, Dennis Garrity, Danan P. Hadi, Suryo Hardiwinoto, Kurniatun Hairiah, Genevieve Michon, Nu Nu San, Cheryl Palm, Soetjipto Partoharjono, Djuber Pasaribu, Eric Penot, Robert Simanungkalit, Martua Sirait, S.M. Sitompul, F.X. Susilo, David Thomas

--------------------------------------------------------------------------

This part of the report concerns Project Output 3.2, development of policy interventions to facilitate the adoption of recommended land uses by (a) reviewing and analyzing policy options and recent institutional experiences relevant to the alternative land uses, (b) facilitating community participation schemes in selected pilot areas, and (c) organizing national workshops and consultations with relevant stakeholders and policymakers for policy and institutional reforms necessary for adoption of recommended land use alternatives.

VI.1Analysis of policy and institutional options

Many of the forces driving deforestation and natural resource degradation arise at the regional or national level. In particular, an inflow of migrants facilitated by road construction and driven by lack of economic opportunity elsewhere can swamp the effects of best-bet alternatives at the field-level. Profitability is a necessary condition for adoption of ‘best bets’ by smallholders, but is not sufficient by itself as a means to slow deforestation. Indeed, precisely because these alternative land uses are profitable, the ‘best-bets’ could have the perverse effect of accelerating deforestation by attracting new migrants to the forest margins. But the relative profitability of forest conversion by smallholders it not determined solely by production technology; it also is tied to institutions and the legal framework that establishes, monitors and enforces boundaries of public land as well as private property rights; to policies regarding public investment in infrastructure and social services; and to macroeconomic policy instruments (exchange rates, monetary and fiscal policies). The institutional and policy environment that is necessary and sufficient for ‘best bet’ alternatives to reduce poverty and deforestation is not well understood yet--and is a top priority of ongoing ASB research. However, it is a sure bet that deforestation will accelerate if profitable innovations for rainfed land uses are introduced where there is open access to forests and within an economy-wide context of rapid population growth and stagnant opportunities elsewhere in agriculture, industry and services.

The key hypothesis underlying the ASB research project in Indonesia can be summarized as: Intensifying land use as an alternative to slash-and-burn can reduce deforestation and reduce poverty. Under which conditions are intensification a reasonable approach; under which ones is it not? At least three necessary conditions for validity of the intensification hypothesis were identified in ASB Phase I (van Noordwijk et al., 1995) and some of their interrelationships are depicted schematically in Figure VI.1.

1. At the plot level, intensification technologies must be environmentally and agronomically sound, socially acceptable, and financially profitable for smallholders.

2. At the community level, there must be effective monitoring and enforcement of property rights.

3. At the provincial and national level, attention must be given to reducing the broader forces that drive deforestation.

Figure VI.1 Forces Driving Deforestation

The first five parts of this report have focused on empirical measurement of relationships at the plot level. But property rights and tenure institutions, public investment in roads, trade policies, and macroeconomic shocks all affect households' livelihood options and, thereby, reduce (or intensify) forces that push migrants to forest margins; this policy and institutional ‘environment’ also has a powerful effect on the natural resource management decisions made by people at the forest margins. Each of these forms a component of ongoing research and is discussed below.

The overall programme—which is chiefly funded by the Asian Development Bank and the Ford Foundation--is designed to determine whether intensification of agroforestry production in specific upland settings can help Indonesia and other Southeast Asian countries and donor agencies balance environmental objectives with economic development and poverty reduction. These issues for policy and institutional research are nested as in Figure VI.2: each topic corresponds to a necessary condition for the intensification hypothesis; none is sufficient alone.

Figure VI.2 Research Framework: Decision Tree for Smallholder Agroforestry Systems for Upland Resource Management

Y

Figure VI.3 ICRAF Southeast Asia Regional Policy Research Agenda

Component	Scale	Main Policy Questions	Clients	Policy Instruments	Research Methods	Collaborators	Sites
Analysis of Land Use Systems	Plot	Are productivity increases feasible and profitable? If so, are they agronomically sustainable? And how are changes in technology and land use likely to affect the supply of global public goods?	Smallholders; NARS; ministries of agriculture, forestry, environment and finance; donor agencies.	Public investments in research and extension. Trade and price policies.	Application of the policy analysis matrix to analysis of private and social profitability, policy distortions, & market imperfections. Rapid assessment tools for agronomic sustainability & biodiversity. Measurement of C stocks & GHG emissions.	ASB Consortia in Indonesia and Thailand; including CASER, FORDA, LATIN, Lampung University and EU Project in Indonesia; Chiang Mai University and the Royal Forest Department in Thailand; TSBF, CIFOR.	Jambi and LampungProvinces on the island of Sumatra in Indonesia. Northern Thailand, focusing on the Mae Chaem watershed with supplemental sites in Mae Taeng and elsewhere as needs are identified in consultation with research partners.
Analysis of Land Use Systems	Watershed / Landscape	How do changes in patterns of land use affect the supply of watershed functions? Specifically, what are the effects of land cover change on: (1) sedimentation of reservoirs, (2) flooding, and (3) seasonal water shortages?	Local communities, local government, NGOs, ministries of agriculture, forestry, environment, and public works; donor agencies.	Land use planning through local participation. Watershed classification. Public investment in infrastructure & other sectoral programmes. Resettlement policies.	Tools to be developed for rapid assessment of watershed functions. Spatial models of watershed functions.	ASB Consortia in Indonesia, Thailand, & the Philippines; incl. FORDA in Indonesia, Chiang Mai, Kasetsart, and Mae Jo Universities, Royal Forest Dept, Dept of Land Development, Royal Project Foundation, & ANU in Thailand, & UPLB in the Philippines.	Upper Tulang Bawang watershed in LampungProvince, Sumatra. Mae Chaem watershed in Northern Thailand. Manupali watershed on Mindanao in the Philippines.
Land & Tree Tenure: Indigenous Institutions	Household / Community	How do indigenous institutions adapt to population pressure? Do indigenous institutions establish and enforce clear resource access and property rights? How do these institutions affect resource management decisions?	Local communities, local government, NARS; NGOs; ministries of internal affairs, agriculture, and forestry; donor agencies.	Institutional endowments (customary, local government, NGO).	Econometric models.	IFPRI and JambiUniversity.	Various communities in the buffer zone of Kerinci Seblat National Park in Sumatra.
Land & Tree Tenure: Options for Institutional Reform	Community	Do existing institutions and regulations establish and enforce clear resource access and property rights? What can communities and government do to improve institutions and regulations in order to better meet social, economic, and environmental objectives?	Same as above.	Institutional reform. Land allocation policy. Sectoral programmes.